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Learning relative values in the striatum induces
violations of normative decision making
Tilmann A. Klein1,2,3, Markus Ullsperger1,4 & Gerhard Jocham1,5
To decide optimally between available options, organisms need to learn the values associated
with these options. Reinforcement learning models offer a powerful explanation of how
these values are learnt from experience. However, human choices often violate normative
principles. We suggest that seemingly counterintuitive decisions may arise as a natural
consequence of the learning mechanisms deployed by humans. Here, using fMRI and a
novel behavioural task, we show that, when suddenly switched to novel choice contexts,
participants’ choices are incongruent with values learnt by standard learning algorithms.
Instead, behaviour is compatible with the decisions of an agent learning how good an option
is relative to an option with which it had previously been paired. Striatal activity exhibits the
characteristics of a prediction error used to update such relative option values. Our data
suggest that choices can be biased by a tendency to learn option values with reference to the
available alternatives.
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A
daptive, goal-directed behaviour requires an individual to
estimate the reward that can be expected from a particular
stimulus or action. According to reinforcement learning
theories, such value estimates are learnt through prediction
errors: the difference between expected reward and reward
actually obtained1. These models have become very inﬂuential in
neuroscience, and we now know that the ﬁring of midbrain
dopamine neurons during learning reﬂects the prediction error
from a class of algorithms known as temporal difference
learning2. This dopaminergic prediction error is thought to be
used as a teaching signal by modulating synaptic plasticity
in target areas, in particular, in the striatum3,4. Accordingly,
many human neuroimaging studies have found prediction errors
represented by striatal activity5–10. The exact nature of prediction
errors encoded in the brain, however, has been less clear.
This raises the more fundamental question of the underlying
computational mechanisms that govern behaviour. The reinfor-
cement learning literature offers a number of algorithms for
learning the value of particular stimuli or actions, or for directly
updating a stochastic choice rule without learning any value
estimates at all1. Here, we suggest that humans do indeed learn
option values, but that these values are learnt with reference to
the currently available alternatives. We further suggest that this
relative value learning can systematically give rise to suboptimal
decision-making behaviour in new contexts.
We recently showed that when participants were allowed to reject
an option offered to them and observe the gain or loss they would
have incurred for choosing that option, striatal activity on these
reject trials represented a prediction error with reversed sign. We
could further show that this was not merely a regret signal10. This
led us to hypothesize that values are learnt relative to the available
alternatives: experiencing an outcome of zero after a reject decision
should increase the value of rejecting upon observing that accepting
the offer would have resulted in a loss. Such referencing of the
available alternatives has already been shown for outcome-related
activity in the striatum, when outcomes were drawn from a
lottery11. In an environment where past experiences can be used to
predict future outcomes, it might be adaptive that learning also
occurs in such a relative frame of reference. In humans, such relative
learning can account for the ﬁnding that learning to avoid an
aversive stimulus is as efﬁcient as learning to approach an appetitive
stimulus, despite the absence of continued negative reinforcement
from the avoided stimulus12. Thus, relative learning can explain
symmetrical performance where previous computational accounts
would have predicted asymmetrical performance. Here, we asked
whether relative value learning in the appetitive domain may
explain suboptimal choice behaviour where previous normative
accounts would predict rational behaviour.
A person who generally eats in mediocre restaurants that only
offer poor to medium quality wine may, when dining in a novel
restaurant, prefer the familiar, medium quality wine over a higher
quality wine. The decision maker would be biased if they had
usually experienced the mediocre wine together with very poor
wines, and the top-quality wine together with other very good
ones. This suggests the intriguing possibility that decisions that
appear to violate transitivity may actually arise naturally from
such a relative value learning mechanism.
We designed a novel reinforcement learning task in which
absolute and relative value learning algorithms make opposite
predictions about choice behaviour upon transition to novel
contexts. We ﬁnd that behaviour is indeed consistent with
participants learning relative option values. In new contexts,
participants show a systematic bias towards options that had
previously been paired with lower-value options, even when those
have an objectively lower reward value. Signals in the striatum
display the full characteristics of a relative value prediction error. In
contrast, we ﬁnd no signals in the striatum or elsewhere in the brain
that could be used for updating the objective values of options.
Results
Behavioural task. Participants saw two pairs of stimuli, AB and
CD (in random sequence), that were probabilistically associated
with reward (0.7 versus 0.5 for AB, 0.5 versus 0.3 for CD).
Participants’ task was to learn by trial and error to select the
better option. After 30 trials of this learning stage, participants
were suddenly switched to a transfer stage, where they now had to
make choices between A versus C and B versus D. Participants
always observed the outcome of both the chosen and the
unchosen option. Importantly, reward probabilities were selected
such that the absolute option values were higher for both A
compared to C and for B compared to D (Fig. 1); however, the
relative values for both A and C, and B and D were identical (0.2
and  0.2, respectively). Thus, an agent learning absolute values
ought to clearly prefer option A over C, and option B over D
immediately on the ﬁrst trial of the transfer phase. By contrast, an
agent learning relative values would be indifferent between the
two options. We refer to these transitions from AB and CD to AC
and BD comparisons as TYPE I transitions. Following this
transfer phase, participants underwent another acquisition phase
with new pairs of stimuli EF and GH. Now, both E and G had an
identically high absolute value (for example, reward probability
P¼ 0.8), but they were either paired with a very poor option
(F, P¼ 0.2) or a moderately good option (H, P¼ 0.6), thus
inducing a higher relative value for E compared to G. Participants
then entered another transfer phase where they selected between
options E and G. This acquisition and transfer procedure was
repeated once for a new pair of stimuli. We refer to these
transitions as TYPE II transitions. In these TYPE II transfer trials,
the opposite behaviour would be expected: an absolute value
learner would be indifferent between E and G because both have
identical reinforcement histories. A relative value learner however
would be biased to prefer E over G, because E has acquired a
higher relative value during acquisition (Fig. 1).
Choices in new context are consistent with relative learning.
We tested two cohorts of healthy participants on this task.
Experiment 1 was a behavioural experiment, in Experiment 2,
participants performed the task during scanning with fMRI.
To obtain formal predictions of behaviour on the ﬁrst transfer
trial and to account for individual differences in acquisition
learning, we ﬁt two different reinforcement learning models to
participants’ behaviour (for modelling details see Supplementary
Methods). The ﬁrst was a Q-learning algorithm that learnt
the objective reward probabilities using a simple delta rule
(Absolute value learner):
Qtþ 1 ¼ Qt þ adt ð1Þ
where Qt is the estimated value on trial t, a is the participant
speciﬁc learning rate and dt¼ dC,t and dU,t is the prediction error
on trial t for the chosen and unchosen option, respectively:
dC;t ¼ rC;t QC;t
dU;t ¼ rU;t QU;t
ð2Þ
where rC,t and rU,t are the rewards (0 or 1) observed on trial t
on the chosen and unchosen option. The second model
(Relative value learner) learnt the relative values of options using
the same update rule as in equation (1):
RVtþ 1 ¼ RVt þ adt ð3Þ
However, here the prediction error dt takes the following form:
dt ¼ ½Rct Rut  RVt ð4Þ
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where Rct and Rut are the outcomes observed on the chosen and
unchosen options, respectively. Thus, the outcome difference is
compared to the expected outcome difference to update the
relative value of options. Note that the Q-learner updates separate
option values; on each trial both options of a given pair are
updated simultaneously. In contrast, for the relative value learner,
there is only one update per trial (for the whole stimulus pair).
Both models make identical predictions about behaviour in the
acquisition phase because in both cases, choices are governed by
value differences (in the former case, value differences operate at
the level of action selection, whereas in the latter case they are
part of learning, see Supplementary Methods for details).
However, the two models make exactly opposite predictions
about choices on the ﬁrst transfer trial. On TYPE I transitions,
an absolute value learner would prefer A over C and B over D
because they have higher reward probabilities. In contrast,
a relative value learner would be indifferent on these trials,
because the options making up the novel combinations AC and
BD have identical relative values (Dp¼ 0.2 for both A and C, and
Dp¼  0.2 for both B and D). In both experiments, participants’
probability to prefer the objectively better option (A or C) on the
ﬁrst trial of TYPE I transitions was not signiﬁcantly different
from chance (P¼ 1, Wilcoxon signed rank test, Fig. 1).
One might argue that, rather than being a systematic signature
of a relative value learning mechanism, this simply reﬂects an
increase in erratic behaviour following the sudden, uninstructed
switch to a novel context. Alternatively, if participants had
deployed policy learning, they would likewise be required to
re-learn a new choice policy when confronted with new
combinations. Importantly, our TYPE II transitions control for
these issues. On these transitions, the opposite behaviour would
be predicted: here, an absolute learner would be indifferent
between options E and G, because they had experienced identical
reinforcement histories. In contrast, a relative learner would show
a preference for option E over G because it had previously been
experienced together with a very low value option and thus has a
high relative value. In both experiments, we found that
participants exhibited a systematic preference for option E on
TYPE II transfer trials (Fig. 1, P¼ 0.0001 and P¼ 0.035
compared to chance, Wilcoxon signed rank test, for Experiments
1 and 2, respectively). Thus, despite the two options having been
paired with reward equally often, participants preferred the
option that had previously been paired with a lower-value option.
The learning models generate choice probabilities for choosing
each option on the ﬁrst trial of each transfer (Fig. 1). From these,
we derived model ﬁts (log likelihood estimates, LLE) and Bayes
Information Criterion, which we used for comparisons between
different models. In both data sets, the relative value learning
A (0.7) B (0.5)
C (0.5) D (0.3) C (0.5) D (0.3)
A (0.7) B (0.5) E (0.8) F (0.2)
G (0.8) H (0.6) G (0.8) 
E (0.8) 
Type I transfer 
Delay (3.5 s) Outcome (1.5 s) ITI (2 – 4s)
Type II transfer 
Absolute learner Relative learner Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Models' choices on first transfer trial Participants' choices on first transfer trial 
a
b
c
Type I Type II Type I Type II Type I Type II Type I Type II
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
P 
(ch
oo
se
 be
tte
r o
pti
on
)
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
P 
(ch
oo
se
 be
tte
r o
pti
on
)
Choice (max. 1.5 s)
Figure 1 | Task structure and model predictions and behaviour. (a) Schematic of the experiment. On each trial, two abstract symbols were presented that
were randomly assigned to a reward probability that remained ﬁxed, but was independent between the two options. Subjects could select the options by
pressing a button with the index ﬁnger of the right or left hand, respectively. Side of option presentation was randomized. After a delay, the outcome
(reward or no reward) was revealed for both the chosen and unchosen option (colour of the frame turning green or red). (b) After 30 acquisition trials,
subjects were suddenly exposed to novel combinations, which we refer to as TYPE I or TYPE II transitions. In TYPE I transitions, the novel combinations
were such that in each pair, there was always one option that had acquired a higher absolute value (A in AC and B in BD), but by virtue of its previous
pairing had acquired the same relative value. By contrast, in TYPE II transitions, there were always two options that had acquired an identical absolute value
(E and G, performed twice with different symbols), but by virtue of previous pairing, E had acquired a higher relative value. (c) Model and real subject
behaviour. Values are mean±s.e.m. probability across subjects to select the better option (A or B) on TYPE I transitions, or option E (higher relative value)
on TYPE II transitions. Reinforcement learning models learning either absolute or relative option values were ﬁt to subjects’ behaviour during acquisition
(left). The value estimates and softmax choice temperature were used to generate model choice probabilities for the ﬁrst transfer trial, before any new
learning could occur. The two classes of models make exactly opposite predictions about behaviour on TYPE I and TYPE II transitions. In both Experiments 1
and 2, subjects’ behaviour is consistent with relative value learning: Participants are indifferent on the ﬁrst trial of TYPE I transitions, but show a systematic
preference on TYPE II transitions.
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model provided a signiﬁcantly better account of behaviour on the
ﬁrst transfer trial than the absolute value learner (mean negative
LLE: 1.92 versus 3.34 and 1.88 versus 3.48 for the relative
versus absolute learner, in Experiments 1 and 2, respectively,
comparison of Bayes Information Criterion: P¼ 0.00002 and
P¼ 0.00018, Wilcoxon signed rank test). The model ﬁts show
that, in stark contrast to the relative value learner, the absolute
value learner performed below chance levels at predicting choices
on the ﬁrst transfer trial (average model choice probability
for selecting the option chosen by the participant¼ 0.62 versus
0.43 and 0.63 versus 0.42 for the relative versus absolute learner in
Experiments 1 and 2, respectively). Note that we focused on the
decisions on the very ﬁrst transfer trial, where choices are
governed by the previously acquired values (Supplementary
Table 1). On subsequent trials, choices are governed by new
learning, and absolute and relative value learning will again
converge to similar behavioural predictions. Despite this, the
relative value learner still tended to perform better compared to
the absolute learner when evaluating model ﬁts for the entire
transfer period (P¼ 0.086 and P¼ 0.077 in Experiments 1 and 2,
Wilcoxon signed rank test, Supplementary Table 1).
The biases upon transfer to a new context had lasting impact
(Fig. 2). Following TYPE I transitions, participants took several
trials to learn to select the higher-value option, and even though
this new learning happened within a few trials, it was somewhat
unstable. Following TYPE II transitions, even late in the transfer
period, there was still evidence for a subtle preference for the
option that previously had acquired a higher relative value. When
averaging over the second half of the transfer phase, we ﬁnd that
participants still show a preference for the higher relative value
option in Experiment 2, and by trend in Experiment 1 (P¼ 0.025
and P¼ 0.065, respectively, Wilcoxon signed rank test).
It is notable that upon transfer to a new context, participants
exhibited a systematic preference for one option over an
alternative option with identical reinforcement history when the
preferred option had previously been paired with a low-value
option. This raises the intriguing possibility that, under certain
circumstances, participants would systematically prefer an option
with a low reward probability over one with a higher value. This
should happen when the low value option has been experienced
in comparison with a very poor option, and in contrast, the high
value option has been experienced in comparison with another
high-value option (as in our introductory wine example). In such
situations, an option with a lower absolute reward probability
would acquire higher relative value and thus should be preferred.
We tested this prediction in a third experiment in a new cohort of
participants. Here, participants were ﬁrst exposed to AB and
CD discrimination learning. The probabilities were 0.6 versus
0.1 (A versus B) and 0.8 versus 0.7 (C versus D). Participants
acquired a robust preference for the better option in both AB and
CD pairs (Fig. 3, Supplementary Fig. 2). After this, they were
suddenly confronted with a new pairing between A and C.
We repeated this entire procedure for eight blocks, using novel
stimuli in each block. We found that, when transferred to choices
between A and C, participants exhibited a clear preference for
the lower value option A over option C on the ﬁrst transfer
trial (P¼ 0.0035, Wilcoxon signed rank test, Fig. 3). This
propensity to select the objectively worse option, which appears
counterintuitive under the assumption of absolute value learning,
is exactly the behaviour predicted from an agent learning
relative values.
Alternative learning mechanisms. The behavioural data so far
are in favour of our suggestion that participants may learn relative
values. However, there are other learning mechanisms that
perform a direct comparison between options. In policy gradient
methods, no value function is learnt at all. Instead, they operate in
policy space13,14 by directly updating a stochastic choice policy.
Such policy learning might be able to explain why performance
degrades to chance level upon TYPE I transitions, because a novel
comparison is introduced and a new policy has to be learnt.
This however cannot explain why participants displayed a
preference for the relatively better option upon TYPE II transi-
tions. Thus, our data appear incompatible with policy learning.
However, other alternative learning mechanisms are possible
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Figure 2 | Learning curves for acquisition and transition to new contexts. In both Experiment 1 (top row) and Experiment 2 (bottom row), subjects
acquire a robust preference for the objectively higher-value option (left). Following TYPE I transitions to a new context, they are initially indifferent between
options, but then gradually re-learn to select the better option, despite occasionally returning to chance levels (middle). Following TYPE II transitions,
subjects display a preference for the option with higher relative value, despite identical reinforcement histories (identical absolute value). It takes up to ten
trials before this declines to indifference due to new learning. Solid lines represent mean, shaded areas s.e.m. across participants. x- and y axes are the same
across all panels.
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(see Supplementary Methods for modelling details). First, one
could argue that participants might not have attended properly
to the outcomes of the unchosen option. Logistic regression
results show that participants’ choices were guided by past
outcomes of both the chosen and unchosen option. However,
at least in Experiment 1, there was evidence that participants
weighted unchosen outcomes somewhat less than chosen
outcomes (Supplementary Fig. 1). We therefore set up two
simple Q-Learners, one that updates only the value of the chosen
option and one that updates both options, but with separate
learning rates for the chosen and unchosen option. Both of these
Q-Learners clearly failed to reproduce participants’ choices on the
ﬁrst transfer trial (Supplementary Table 1). We also compared
our algorithm to a different variant of relative learning12. This
algorithm differs slightly from the one we present here in that,
unlike our algorithm, it does track separate option values. These
however are not updated in absolute terms, but relative to an
average state value, that in turn is separately updated. Although
this state-dependent relative value learner (SD-RVL) was superior
compared to our simple RVL during acquisition in Experiment 1
(and by trend in Experiment 2, P¼ 0.002 and P¼ 0.09,
respectively, Wilcoxon signed rank test), it did not provide a
good account of choices on the ﬁrst transfer trial in the new
context, the key measure of interest in this study (Supplementary
Table 1). This is likely due to the higher learning rate for the
chosen versus unchosen option (Supplementary Table 2), which
induces a bias towards the chosen option. SD-RVL is
conceptually similar to actor-critic learning. The actor-critic
architecture we implemented likewise did not provide a good
account of participants’ choices in the transfer phase (Suppleme-
ntary Table 1). Furthermore, it is possible that options are
preferred at transfer simply because they had been chosen more
frequently during previous acquisition15. We tested this using
logistic regression to assess whether the relative frequency of
choosing one option (for example, A from AB minus C from CD)
was predictive of preference (for example, A from AC) in the ﬁrst
transfer trial. We ran this separately for the ﬁrst transfer trial in
each of the four novel combinations. In Experiment 1, there was
no effect of choice frequency on bias (t-test on the regression
weights, P40.25). In Experiment 2, there was only a trend for B
versus D choices in predicting preference for B (t-test, P¼ 0.09).
Notably, in the two TYPE II transfer trials where the bias is
actually observed, the effect of choice frequency was far from
signiﬁcant (t-test, P40.26). Lastly, we wanted to assure
participants had learnt all discriminations that were later
recombined equally well (for example, whether they were as
good at selecting option A from the AC pair as they were at
preferring C from CD, prior to exposition to the new
combinations AC and BD). We tested the rate at which options
had been chosen during the ﬁnal ﬁve trials of acquisition. In
Experiment 1, ANOVA revealed no effect of option pair
(F5,145¼ 1.47, P¼ 0.2). In Experiment 2, ANOVA revealed an
effect of option pair (F5,115¼ 2.8, P¼ 0.02). Importantly however,
post-hoc t-tests showed that this effect was not driven by
differences between the option pairs that formed the new
combinations during transfer (for example, between AB versus
CD which make up the new transfer pairs AC and BD).
Furthermore, logistic regression on the average rate of option
choices during the last ﬁve trials showed no effect of learning
success on later bias on the ﬁrst transfer trial (P¼ 0.25 and 0.15
for Experiments 1 and 2, respectively, t-test). Furthermore, we
ran a separate logistic regression to rule out that any bias on the
ﬁrst transfer trial was due to motor perseveration with regard
to the preceding trial. We found no effect of last motor response
on choice bias during transfer in any of the three experiments
(all P40.25, t-test).
Neural signatures of a relative value prediction error. Our
behavioural data thus far speak to our assumption that partici-
pants did indeed learn relative option values. We next sought to
investigate whether neural signals also aligned with such a relative
value learning mechanism. We focused our analyses on the
striatum as the key area where reward prediction errors are
thought to drive learning16. We extracted BOLD signal time
courses from an independent striatal region of interest
(ROI, Supplementary Fig. 6A, see Methods), cut it into trial
epochs and regressed parameters of interest against this epoched
time series in a multiple linear regression (see Methods).
The striatal BOLD signal showed a pronounced correlation
with the relative value prediction error derived from our model
(Fig. 4a, peak t23¼ 5.3, cluster-corrected P¼ 0.0002, permutation
test). One hallmark of a prediction error signal is that it is
sensitive to both the outcome (here: relative outcome) and
expectation term. Speciﬁcally, a neural signal that is a prediction
error should covary positively with the outcome, but negatively
with the expectation term. We therefore set up a separate
regression that contained both the expected relative value of the
chosen option and the relative outcome (chosen unchosen
outcome). Again, we found a positive correlation with
relative outcome (peak t23¼ 5.53, cluster-corrected Po0.00001,
permutation test), but also a negative effect of the expectation
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Figure 3 | Induction of a systematic preference for the worse option. Using the same experimental setup as in Fig. 1a, subjects ﬁrst learnt to select the
better option in two pairs, AB and CD. Option A had a moderate value (reward probability P¼0.6), but by virtue of pairing with low-value option B (P¼0.1)
it acquired a high relative value. By contrast, option C had a high absolute value (P¼0.8), but by virtue of pairing with high-value option D (P¼0.7), it only
acquired a low relative value. Subjects acquired a robust preference for A over B (left) and for C over D (middle). However, when they were suddenly
confronted with novel choices between options A and C (right), they systematically preferred the lower-value option A, consistent with relative value
learning. Solid lines represent mean, shaded areas s.e.m. across participants.
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term (peak t23¼ –3.02, cluster-corrected P¼ 0.01, permutation
test, Fig. 4b). Thus, the signal correlated with both component
terms, relative value and relative outcome, of a relative
value prediction error. However, it is possible that this effect
is exclusively driven by the value and outcome of the chosen
option. If the signal truly represents a relative value prediction
error, it needs to be sensitive to the components of both the
chosen and the unchosen option. In another regression we
therefore further decomposed relative value and relative outcome
into their component terms: the option values QC and QU for the
chosen and unchosen option, and the outcomes RC and RU on the
chosen and unchosen option. Note that during the acquisition
phase, relative value is equivalent to the difference between QC
and QU. We ﬁnd a positive effect of RC and a negative effect of RU
(peak t23¼ 3.23 and  4.54, cluster-corrected P¼ 0.004 and
0.0006, permutation test, Fig. 4c). We also ﬁnd a positive effect of
QU (peak t23¼ 2.05, cluster-corrected P¼ 0.045, permutation
test). In addition, there was a negative effect of QC
(peak t23¼ 2.05), which however did not survive cluster-
correction (P¼ 0.107, permutation test). Thus, the striatal
signal displays the full characteristics of a relative value
prediction error. If the signal was used to merely update
absolute option values, both outcome and the expectation
would have the same sign on the chosen and unchosen option
(positive for outcome, negative for expectation). The results
reported so far are from an ROI covering parts of all three major
striatal subregions. We found little evidence for regional
differences within the striatum when we repeated our analyses
separately for the ventral striatum, caudate nucleus and putamen
(see Supplementary Methods and Supplementary Fig. 7). The
only notable difference was that coding of relative value, which
was present in both left and right caudate and putamen, was
not detectable in the ventral striatum. There was no relative
value effect in the right ventral striatum, while in the left
ventral striatum, there was an effect that however did not survive
cluster-correction (P¼ 0.11, permutation test).
One could expect that participants in which striatal coding of
relative value or relative outcome was very pronounced would
also be strongly governed by relative values in their choices on the
ﬁrst transfer trial. We therefore set up a design matrix that
contained (along with a constant term) the striatal time courses of
regression coefﬁcients for relative value, relative outcome and
response (not shown in Fig. 4b) and regressed this matrix against
behaviour on the ﬁrst transfer trial. As dependent variable, we
used the model ﬁts of the relative value learner on the ﬁrst
transfer trial, reasoning that participants with very low (negative)
log likelihood estimates are the ones who are strongly guided
by relative value. We found a positive relation between relative
value and the relative learner’s model ﬁt (peak t23¼ 3.13,
cluster-corrected P¼ 0.035, permutation test). Speciﬁcally, a
more pronounced negative effect of relative value following
outcome presentation was related to lower log likelihoods
(meaning behaviour was strongly guided by relative learning,
Fig. 4d). Thus, stronger striatal expression of relative value was
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correlated positively with the chosen outcome, RC and negatively with chosen value, QC—and it correlated negatively with unchosen outcome RU, and
positively with unchosen value, QU. Solid lines represent mean, shaded areas s.e.m. of regression coefﬁcients across participants. (d) Relationship between
striatal relative value coding and relative value-induced biases. Striatal regression coefﬁcients for relative value, relative outcome and response (not shown
in b) were regressed against model ﬁts (negative log likelihoods) of the relative value learner for the ﬁrst transfer trial. The ﬁgure shows the time course of
the resulting T-score for relative value. This indicates that subjects that showed pronounced negative coding of relative value after outcome presentation
were also strongly guided by relative values on the ﬁrst transfer trial (low negative log likelihoods).
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related to behaviour being dominated by relative learning. We
next asked whether relative value prediction errors were
expressed in other brain areas in addition to the striatum. To
explore this, a whole-brain contrast of RCRU (see next section
‘Neural signatures of other learning mechanisms’ and Fig. 5)
identiﬁed a number of brain regions that responded to
relative outcome (increased responding when the chosen option
was rewarded and decreased responding to rewards on the
non-chosen option). We then tested whether activity in these
candidate regions would also correlate negatively with relative
value. We thresholded the relative outcome contrast map at
z43.1 (we deliberately used a low threshold here to not miss
potential regions also showing evidence of relative value learning)
and extracted BOLD time series from ﬁve ROIs: the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), lateral orbitofrontal cortex (lOFC),
hippocampus, posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) and the
posterior superior parietal lobule (pSPL). None of these regions
showed a signiﬁcant negative correlation with relative value
(cluster-corrected P40.24, Fig. 6) following outcome presenta-
tion. Instead, we observed positive coding of relative value
following stimulus onset in vmPFC, hippocampus, pSPL and
PCC (Po0.03, uncorrected for multiple comparisons), and a
trend in lOFC (peak t23¼ 1.82, P¼ 0.08, uncorrected).
Neural signatures of other learning mechanisms. Our results so
far show that signals across all three striatal regions display the
characteristics of a prediction error that is used to update the
relative values of options. We next asked whether there is any
region in the brain that might learn option values in absolute
terms, that is, an independent estimate of each option’s reward
probability. A signal useful for such learning would be required to
show the same behaviour on both the chosen and the unchosen
option—it needs to correlate positively with the outcome of both
the chosen (RC) and the unchosen option (RU), but negatively
with the expected value of both options (QC and QU). Since the
effects of expected value are usually less pronounced compared to
outcome effects17, we ﬁrst searched for possible candidate regions
by looking for regions that showed a positive response to both RC
and RU at the time of outcome presentation. We masked the
contrasts for þRC and –RU at Po0.1 and multiplied the resulting
maps to obtain a liberal threshold of Po0.01, uncorrected. Even
at this very lenient threshold, we only found one region in the
brain that responded positively to both RC and RU. This region
was in the bilateral calcarine sulcus. Further analyses revealed
that this region also negatively encoded QC (peak t23¼ 2.39,
cluster-corrected P¼ 0.049, permutation test), with no evidence
for an effect of QU (peak t23¼ 1.69, Supplementary Fig. 6). Thus,
primary visual cortex was the only region that showed some
evidence for an update signal to learn the absolute value of the
chosen option, with no evidence for a similar update signal for
the unchosen option. Notably, the general pattern that we found
was instead that regions that showed increased responding
when the chosen option was rewarded deactivated when the
unchosen option was rewarded, and vice versa (Fig. 5).
Importantly, this cannot simply be explained by an anticorre-
lation of the two regressors (average correlation across partici-
pants following convolution with the haemodynamic response
r¼ 0.22, see also Supplementary Table 3 and Supplementary
Fig. 3 for correlations between all regressors in the design matrix).
Instead, it appears that a distributed set of brain regions is
responsive to the outcome difference between the chosen and the
unchosen option. The opposite pattern, an increased responding
to RU and decreased responding to RC could only be observed in a
few regions at a lenient threshold of Po0.01 uncorrected.
Among these where the insular cortex and a region of the
pre-supplementary motor cortex (pre-SMA) in the posterior
medial frontal cortex (pMFC, Fig. 7). At this low threshold, an
additional area in the region of the intraparietal sulcus (IPS)
showed increased responding to RU, without responding to RC. Of
these regions, the pMFC is of particular interest given the
evidence implicating it in representing the value of switching
away from the current default option18,19. We therefore extracted
BOLD time series from the peak in the pMFC (MNI x¼ –4,
y¼ 17, z¼ 49) and IPS (MNI x¼ –41, y¼ –45, z¼ 44) and
performed the same decomposition as in Fig. 4c to test for
learning signals in these areas. In both pMFC and IPS there was a
positive effect of QU (peak t23¼ 3.43 and 3.72, cluster-corrected
P¼ 0.014 and 0.00022, permutation test, Fig. 7b). In addition,
there was a negative effect of QC in IPS (peak t23¼ 3.24,
cluster-corrected P¼ 0.022, permutation test) but not in pMFC
(cluster-corrected P¼ 1). Thus, both pMFC and IPS encoded
unchosen value and unchosen outcome, but with the same sign
(rather than with opposite sign, as would be expected from
a prediction error). Hence, pMFC and IPS signals do not fulﬁl
the criteria for being prediction errors to learn either absolute
or relative values.
Lastly, we asked whether there were regions in the brain
that might encode effector-speciﬁc action values. In our task,
the side of option presentation was randomized, such that
learning action values would not be adaptive. Nevertheless, it is
possible that action prediction errors are encoded in the brain,
even when not contributing to behaviour. When ﬁrst running
this analysis at whole-brain level, even at a very lenient threshold
of Po0.01, we found no signiﬁcant correlation with left or right
action value prediction error. We also ran this analysis using
an ROI-based approach to directly study two key areas for
encoding motor parameters, the primary motor cortex and the
sensorimotor striatum. There was no evidence for a prediction
error on the left or right option (all P40.31 uncorrected,
Supplementary Fig. 8) in the period between 3 and 8 s after
the outcome.
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Figure 5 | Whole-brain analysis of relative value effects. Many brain
regions were sensitive to relative outcome (RC RU, left column). This was
driven by both increased responding to rewards on the chosen option
(þ RC, middle column) and decreased response to rewards on the
unchosen option (–RU, right column). Colourbars indicate z-scores. Images
are thresholded at z43.1.
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Discussion
We have shown that, upon transfer to a new context, participants’
choices are consistent with the behaviour of an agent who has
learnt option values with reference to the previously available
alternative options. By creating novel choice contexts, in which
objective reward probabilities diverged from the options’ relative
values acquired during the previous context, we showed that
participants’ choices on the ﬁrst trials appeared to be governed by
relative values. Neural activity in the striatum correlated with a
prediction error that is used to update these relative values. While
activity in a number of brain regions represented relative reward
(the reward difference between the chosen and the unchosen
option), the striatum was unique in that it was the only region
in which the signal fulﬁlled the formal criteria of a relative
value prediction error. Notably, we found no signal anywhere in
the brain that met even the most basic criteria for an update
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Figure 6 | Relative value coding in other brain regions. A whole-brain contrast (see Fig. 5) revealed several areas that positively coded relative outcome.
We extracted BOLD signals (interpolated to a resolution of 300ms) from these areas to test if any of these was also sensitive to relative value (RVAL), thus
being candidates for a region coding relative value prediction errors as shown for the striatum in Fig. 4. Solid lines represent mean, shaded areas s.e.m. of
regression coefﬁcients across participants. x- and y axes are the same across all panels.
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Figure 7 | pMFC and IPS outcome signals. (a) The opposite pattern as in Fig. 5, an increased response to rewards on the unchosen option was
conspicuously absent. Only at a very lenient threshold (Po0.01, uncorrected) could we identify regions in pMFC, intraparietal sulcus (IPS) and anterior
insula (not shown) that increased responding to rewards on the unchosen option (insula and pMFC additionally responded with signal decrease to chosen
outcome, which was not observed for IPS). Therefore, these regions might be candidate regions for learning the value of the non-chosen option. Colourbars
indicate z-scores. Images are thresholded at Z42.33. (b) However, while the BOLD signal (interpolated to a resolution of 300ms) in both pMFC and IPS
was sensitive to unchosen value, QU, following outcome presentation, this effect was pointing in the wrong direction. Both QU and RU correlated positively
with the BOLD signal in this region, incommensature with a prediction error on the unchosen option. Solid lines represent mean, shaded areas s.e.m. of
regression coefﬁcients across participants.
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signal that teaches the objective value either of both the chosen
and unchosen option, or the unchosen option alone.
In most learning situations, relative and absolute value learning
produce identical behaviours. This becomes fundamentally
different when previously learnt options are suddenly encoun-
tered in a different context. Previous studies have used such
transfers to new contexts9,20,21, but usually in a way that relative
values were identical to absolute value differences. Here, we
created contexts in which absolute and relative value learning
made opposite predictions about behaviour on the ﬁrst trial in the
new context (before any new learning could occur). First,
participants made choices between two options that had
different absolute values (for example, p(reward)¼ 0.7 and 0.5),
but had previously acquired an identical relative value, because
both options had previously been paired with an option that was
worse by the same margin. Participants were indifferent on the
ﬁrst trial of the new context, selecting the objectively better option
only at chance level, as predicted by a relative learning algorithm.
One may argue that the unexpected transfer to a new context
caused participants’ choices to become erratic. Alternatively,
policy gradient methods13 might also explain chance-level
performance on the ﬁrst transfer trial, since it appears natural
that a new context requires establishing a new policy. However,
with our TYPE II transfers, we had another condition in which
participants showed, on the ﬁrst trial in the new context, a
systematic preference for one option over the other, despite the
two previously having received identical reinforcement histories
(that is, same absolute values). The option preferred by
participants, however, had previously acquired a higher relative
value by virtue of pairing with a lower-value alternative option.
This appears hard to explain by erratic behaviour or by re-setting
of the choice policy upon transfer to a new context. Even more
strikingly, in a further experiment we show that participants
systematically preferred an option that had a lower absolute value
compared to the alternative option when this lower value option
had previously acquired a higher relative value. We tried to rule
out a number of alternative explanations, such as diminished
attention to the outcomes of the unchosen option. We show that
participants’ choices were guided by outcomes of both the chosen
and unchosen options. Furthermore, absolute learning models
updating either only the chosen option, or both options but with
separate learning rates, were not able to reproduce the
behavioural pattern upon transfer to a new context. The same
was true for actor-critic learning.
Deviations from economically rational behaviour are well-
known in the literature on economic and perceptual decision
making22–25. While a number of studies have investigated the
neural underpinnings of these so-called cognitive biases, these
studies focus on the decision-making process using options with
values known to participants. However, decision makers often have
to estimate option values from experience. Reinforcement learning
models offer a powerful framework for studying this learning from
experience. It has recently been shown that relative value learning
can account for efﬁcient avoidance learning (providing a solution
to a computational paradox)12. Importantly, this study also
suggests that seemingly irrational economic decisions can arise as
a consequence of context-dependent relative value learning.
Behavioural ecology has described examples of context-, or state-
dependent learning in a number of species26–28. Honeybees were
more likely to leave a reward source that contained a 20% sucrose
solution when they had previously been trained to expect a 50%
sucrose solution, compared to control animals that had only
experienced the 20% solution29. It has been suggested that
behaviour that appears suboptimal in simpliﬁed laboratory
settings arises as a consequence of decision rules that have been
favoured by natural selection because they are beneﬁcial in
naturalistic environments30–32. Here, we apply algorithmic
models of reinforcement learning to account for such context-
dependent learning in humans. We show that when information
about both options is available, humans appear to learn option
values relative to the available alternatives. Our data do not
necessarily generalize to situations where outcome information is
provided only for the chosen option. A recent study comparing
such partial feedback contexts with complete feedback showed that
while relative value learning was more pronounced in complete
feedback contexts, it was also present in the partial feedback
context, hinting at the possibility that relative value encoding might
generalize to partial feedback contexts12. Another study using a
similar design but only partial feedback likewise found behaviour
that was not compatible with learning of objective values33.
We have used a very simple approach to model relative value
learning by substituting the outcome difference for absolute
outcome in standard Q-learning algorithms. There are other ways
of implementing a relative learner. Palminteri and colleagues12
used an algorithm that learnt the average value of the current
context (state value) and then (unlike in our approach) separate
option values were learnt with reference to that state value. While
this approach was less successful than our algorithm at predicting
choices in the new context, we explicitly refrain from making
claims about what would be the best relative value learning
model. Our neural data are incompatible with learning of separate
option values, even when they are referenced to state value, since
both the expectation and the outcome term of the unchosen
option were encoded with reversed sign compared to the chosen
option, which is indicative of a signal that encodes the direct
relative advantage of one option over the other. This is consistent
with Palminteri and colleagues showing that the striatal signal
correlates positively with the chosen prediction error, but
negatively with the unchosen prediction error12. The exact
algorithm used by participants is however likely to vary with
speciﬁcs of the task at hand.
Activity in the striatum at the time when the outcomes of
the two options were revealed exhibited the characteristics of
a relative value prediction error. The BOLD signal encoded
all component terms of a relative value prediction error with
the appropriate sign. Whereas a recent study reporting a
risk-sensitive prediction error found the ventral striatum to be
unique in responding to all components of a prediction error34,
we found no evidence for a differential pattern of responses
between the three major striatal subregions. The properties of the
striatal signal were somewhat unique: while several regions in the
brain correlated positively with relative outcome, none of these
regions exhibited the characteristics of a relative value prediction
error. Notably, even at a very liberal threshold, we found brain
region that showed characteristics of a prediction error for
learning absolute values of both options independently. Similarly,
we could not ﬁnd any signals related to updating the absolute
value of the unchosen option alone. Few areas in the brain like
pMFC, insula and IPS showed increased responding to rewards
on the unchosen option (at a very lenient threshold). However,
none of these areas showed a negative effect of unchosen value.
Taken together, we ﬁnd a number of brain regions that exhibited
relative outcome effects, with the striatum encoding a relative
value prediction error. By contrast, we unexpectedly found no
signal anywhere in the brain that might be useful for updating
absolute option values. One explanation may be that absolute
values and outcomes are only transiently represented in the brain
and rapidly transformed into relative values and relative
outcomes. Such transient network states would be invisible with
fMRI, but might be detected using the high temporal resolution of
MEG35. Thus, it still appears possible that both absolute and
relative values are updated simultaneously, consistent with the
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notion of multiple systems for learning and memory operating in
parallel36–41. One recent study found that the striatal signal
correlated with relative outcome, corresponding to a policy
prediction error, with no representation of either chosen or
unchosen value anywhere in the brain, not even at liberal
thresholds14. This is surprising since the task they used is
essentially identical to the acquisition phase of our task. One
reason for this discrepancy may lie in the analysis approaches
used (for example, whole-brain versus ROI).
Our results also bear some resemblance to a ﬁctive error signal
described in the striatum42 which represented the difference
between reward obtained and the maximum possible reward.
This ﬁctive error however corresponds to a regret signal. This is
not the case in our study, where the striatal signal not only
correlates negatively with foregone rewards but also positively
with the expected value of the unchosen option. One question
arising from the relative value coding scheme we found pertains
to what the frame of reference would be in multi-alternative
choice contexts, where there is more than one unchosen option.
One study suggests that in such situations, learning might occur
relative to an estimated next-best option43.
Taken together, both our behavioural data and the striatal BOLD
signal align with the predictions of an algorithm learning the value
of options relative to the available alternatives. Relative value signals
have been well described in the decision-making literature, where it
is often found that vmPFC activity correlates with the difference
between the chosen and unchosen option value44–48. Similarly, a
number of studies suggests that value representations are
normalized by the range of available alternatives (for review see
ref. 49), similar to divisive normalization in sensory systems50.
Decision making is often inﬂuenced by the context in which
decisions are made. Our results take this one step further to suggest
that seemingly irrational decisions may arise because even the
learning of option values is already dependent on the context in
which these options are encountered during learning.
Methods
Participants. We tested n¼ 30 participants (age: mean±s.d. 25.07±3.1 years,
n¼ 15 female) in experiment 1, n¼ 24 participants (age: 26.21±3.7, n¼ 12
female) in experiment 2, and n¼ 21 participants (age: 25.04±2.4, n¼ 12 female) in
experiment 3. All participants were healthy volunteers and gave written informed
consent before participation. The procedures were conducted in accordance with
the Declaration of Helsinki and the guidelines of the ethics committee of the
University of Leipzig.
Behavioural task. We used a reinforcement learning task in which participants
repeatedly made choices between two abstract symbols that were probabilistically
associated with reward. Participants’ task was to learn, by trial and error, to
maximize their rewards by selecting the option with the higher reward probability.
Each trial started with presentation of the two options until the participant
responded by pressing a button with the index ﬁnger of the left or right hand,
respectively. If no response was registered within 1.5 s, a prompt appeared
instructing participants to respond faster. In the case of such missed responses, the
trial was repeated to ensure that participants were able to learn the underlying
reward probabilities prior to being switched to a new context. Once a response was
made, the choice was conﬁrmed by a thickening of the grey frame around the
chosen option. This remained onscreen until presentation of the outcome, which
always occurred 3.5 s after the choice. The outcome was indicated by a change of
the colour of the frame around the option. When an option was rewarded, the
frame turned green, when it was not rewarded, it turned red. Participants were
instructed that they could earn a bonus of up to h8 (each reward obtained on the
chosen option yielded h0.03), depending on how often their choices resulted in
reward. Furthermore, they were also instructed that the outcome of the unchosen
option had no ﬁnancial consequences for them, but that they could nevertheless
use these outcomes to learn about ‘how good’ the other option was. Logistic
regression (Supplementary Fig. 1) showed that participants used the outcomes of
both the chosen and unchosen option to guide their choices. The outcome was
displayed for 1.5 s, which was followed by an intertrial interval (blank grey screen,
2–4 s) before the next trial began. We ran the task twice, once as a behavioural
study (Experiment 1) and once while scanning with fMRI (Experiment 2).
In Experiment 1, trial timing was faster than in the fMRI study: the delay between
choice and outcome was set to 1 s, the intertrial interval was 1 s. In a third
experiment, we ran a modiﬁed version of the task (see below) as behavioural study.
Importantly, the task consisted of acquisition and transfer stages. In a ﬁrst
acquisition stage, participants made choices between symbols pairs AB and CD that
were presented in random order for 30 trials each. The reward probability
for A and B was P¼ 0.7 and P¼ 0.5, the probability for C and D was P¼ 0.5 and
P¼ 0.3. After this acquisition, subjects entered the transfer stage, where they were
presented with novel combinations AC and BD for 30 trials. Participants were not
informed of this change of context. Participants were presented with trial outcomes
during the transfer stage just as they were during the ﬁrst stage, allowing them to
continually learn option values. An agent learning absolute option values would
exhibit a preference for A over C (P¼ 0.7 versus 0.5) and for B over D (P¼ 0.5
versus 0.3) on the ﬁrst transfer trial. By contrast, an agent learning relative
values would be indifferent on the ﬁrst transfer trial, because in both AC and BD
trials, both options had acquired the same relative value (RV¼ 0.2 for A and C,
RV¼  0.2 for B and D). We refer to these transfers as TYPE I transitions
(differing absolute value, same relative value). This was followed by another
acquisition phase where subjects were presented with pairs EF and GH. Here, the
probabilities were P¼ 0.7 and 0.2 (EF) and P¼ 0.7 and 0.5 (GH). After 30 trials,
subjects entered another transfer stage where they now made choices between the
novel combination EG. We repeated this procedure once with new stimuli for EF
and GH, where the probabilities were 0.8 versus 0.3 (EF) and 0.8 versus 0.6 (GH).
We refer to the two sets of EF and GH stimuli as EF(1) and GH(1), and EF(2) and
GH(2), respectively, in Supplementary Figs 4 and 5. Here, an agent learning
absolute values ought to be indifferent between E and G on the ﬁrst transfer trial,
because both options have identical reinforcement histories (P¼ 0.7 or P¼ 0.8,
respectively). In contrast, an agent learning relative values should start the transfer
stage with a preference for E, because it acquired a higher relative value compared
to G during the learning phase (for example, RV¼ 0.5 for E versus RV¼ 0.2 for G).
We refer to this kind of transfer as TYPE II transitions (same absolute value,
differing relative value). While in TYPE I transitions, both stimuli from each pair
could be used to create a novel combination of options of the same relative value
(AC and BD), from the pairs EF and GH we could only use E and G to create one
novel pair of options with different relative (but same absolute) value. Thus, in
order to have two TYPE II transitions, we repeated this procedure once with a
novel set of stimuli EF and GH (see above). Thus, there were two transitions for
both TYPE I (AC and BD trials) and TYPE II (EG1 and EG2 trials) transitions.
Experiment 3 had the same structure of acquisition and transfer stages. However,
here probabilities were structured such that upon transfer, relative values would
mandate choice of the option with a lower absolute value. In particular, subjects
learnt to select the better option from pairs AB (P¼ 0.6 and 0.1) and CD (P¼ 0.8
and 0.7) for 40 trials for each pair. Thereafter, they performed ten transfer trials,
where they had to select between options A and C. This procedure was repeated
seven times using novel stimuli in each block. An agent learning absolute values
would prefer option C over A, because of its higher objective value (P¼ 0.8 versus
0.6). An agent learning relative values however would systematically prefer the
objectively less valuable option A, since it has acquired a higher relative value than
C (relative value¼ 0.5 versus 0.1).
Acquisition and analysis of MRI data. MRI data were acquired on a 3T Siemens
Magnetom Trio system equipped with a 12 channel phased array head coil.
Forty-ﬁve slices (3mm thickness, no interslice gap) were obtained tilted with an
angle of 30 with respect to the anterior commissure–posterior commissure line
using a single-shot gradient echo-planar imaging (EPI) sequence (repetition time,
3,000ms; echo time, 30ms; bandwidth, 116 kHz; ﬂip angle, 90; 64 64 pixel
matrix; ﬁeld of view, 192mm) sensitive to blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD)
contrast. A total of 994 volumes were acquired on average, depending on subjects’
reaction times and number of trials missed, thus resulting in a total task duration of
about 50min. For B0 unwarping of the EPI images, ﬁeld maps were acquired using
a gradient echo sequence (TR: 1,260ms; TE: 5.20, 9.39 and 15.38ms; ﬂip angle: 60;
128 128 pixel matrix, FOV: 210mm) of the same geometry as the EPI images. To
improve localization, a high resolution anatomical brain image was recorded from
each participant in a separate session using a modiﬁed driven equilibrium Fourier
transform sequence. We used Presentation (Neurobehavioural Systems, USA) to
present the task and record subjects’ behaviour.
Analysis of fMRI data was performed using tools from the Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging of the Brain (FMRIB) Software Library, FSL51. Functional data
were motion-corrected using rigid-body registration to the central volume52,
corrected for geometric distortions using the ﬁeld maps and an n-dimensional
phase-unwrapping algorithm53, high-pass ﬁltered using a Gaussian-weighted
lines ﬁlter (1/100Hz) and spatially smoothed using a Gaussian ﬁlter with 6mm
full-width at half maximum. EPI images were registered with the high-resolution
brain images and normalized into standard (MNI) space using afﬁne registration54.
A general linear model was ﬁtted into prewhitened data space to account for local
autocorrelations55. For whole-brain analysis, we set up a single GLM that contained
two regressors that coded for the outcome (reward or non-reward) on the chosen
and unchosen option (modelled at outcome onset) and four regressors coding for
the main effects of stimulus presentation (modelled at stimulus onset), outcome
presentation (modelled at outcome onset) and left and right responses (modelled as
stick functions at response onset). In addition, the six motion parameters from the
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motion correction were included in the model to account for residual head
motion. Contrasts were computed for the chosen and unchosen outcomes,
and for the difference between chosen and unchosen outcomes. This served to
identify candidate regions for other kinds of learning signals (shown in Fig. 7).
Additionally, we contrasted right versus left responses to identify brain regions
coding motor parameters. Contrast images from the ﬁrst level were then taken to
the group level using a random effects analysis. Results are reported at Po0.001
uncorrected, unless stated otherwise. Note that we deliberately applied a lenient
threshold. This is because these analyses were designed to identify regions that did
not conform with our hypothesis of relative value learning and instead might
exhibit absolute value learning.
ROI analyses. To obtain an independent functional ROI of the striatum, we used
the z-map of prediction error effects from a previous study9 (data taken from placebo
condition), thresholded it at Z42.3 and multiplied the resulting image with
anatomical masks from the Harvard–Oxford subcortical atlas for the caudate nucleus,
putamen and ventral striatum of the left and right hemisphere. We merged these
masks together to yield one mask for the entire striatum, in addition to the six
subregion- and hemisphere-speciﬁc masks (Supplementary Fig. 6A). The putaminal
parts of this mask were additionally used for the analysis searching for action value
prediction errors (Supplementary Fig. 8). A ROI for left and right motor cortex was
obtained by thresholding the contrast image for right versus left responses at z45.0.
In addition, we extracted data from the peak of MFC and IPS that responded to
unchosen outcomes, as described in the results section. The BOLD data from these
regions were then processed as in previous studies10,47,48 according to the following
procedures: Using custom-written Matlab routines, the time series of each volunteer
was ﬁrst cut into trials with a duration of 14.4 s, where options were presented at 0 s,
the response was made at 0.9 s (the mean response time across subjects) and the
outcome was presented at 4.32 s, which corresponds to the mean onsets of these
events across subjects and trials. Time series were resampled to a resolution of 300ms
using cubic spline interpolation. Thus, the resulting data matrix was of size m n,
where m¼ number of trials and n¼ number of time points. A GLM containing the
parameters of interest was then ﬁtted at each time point for each participant (across
trials). Note that regressors are not modelled at any speciﬁc onset; instead the entire
GLM is ﬁtted at each time point in a trial to the data of all trials at this time point.
This resulted in a time course of effect sizes for each regressor in the design matrix
and for each participant. These time courses were then averaged across participants.
A ﬁrst GLM was set up that contained (along with a constant) only the relative value
prediction error. Further GLMs were then set up to further examine the relative value
prediction error in greater detail. First, the prediction error was decomposed into its
constituent terms, relative value and relative outcome, using separate regressors.
Finally, both of these terms were further decomposed into QC and QU (relative value)
and RC and RU (relative outcome). A separate analysis was designed to search for
potential action value signal. This GLM included (along with a constant) two
regressors coding the action values for the left and right option, and two regressors
coding for the outcome on the left and right option (for the sake of clarity, we show
the effects of action value prediction error for the left and right option, without
further splitting up the prediction error into left and right action values and
outcomes). In all models, the response (left or right) made by the subject and the
(log) response time on each trial was included as additional covariate. The time
courses of regression coefﬁcients were tested for signiﬁcant effects using cluster-based
random permutation testing. The time series of regression coefﬁcients was randomly
sign-ﬂipped, a t-statistic was computed, and t-scores were summed in contiguous
clusters along the time dimension signiﬁcant at a¼ 0.05. This was repeated 5,000
times and the largest cluster in each iteration was kept to generate a null distribution
of signiﬁcant clusters. This was then compared to the largest cluster observed
empirically in our data. As in previous work10, we considered the time between 4 and
8 s post-outcome for statistical testing, corresponding to the window during which
the BOLD response is expected to peak.
Data availability. The authors declare that all the behavioural raw data that were
used in this manuscript are included in the Supplementary Information. The fMRI
data sets generated in this study and code used to analyse the data are available
from the corresponding author on reasonable request.
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